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Abstract
In this paper we present a framework for the speciﬁcation of information ﬂow properties for distributed sys-
tems. We consider partially speciﬁed distributed systems in which there are several unspeciﬁed components
located in diﬀerent places. As a case study, in this paper we consider the notion of Non Deducibility on
Composition, NDC for short, originally proposed for nondeterministic systems and based on trace semantics.
We study how this information ﬂow property can be extended in order to deal also with distributed par-
tially speciﬁed systems. In particular, we adapt the NDC property to distributed systems by distinguishing
between two diﬀerent approaches. The ﬁrst one we call centralized NDC, according to which there is just
one unspeciﬁed global component that has complete control of the n distributed locations where interaction
occurs between the system and the unspeciﬁed component. The second one is called distributed NDC,
according to which there is one unspeciﬁed component for each distributed location, and the n unspeciﬁed
components are completely independent, i.e., they cannot coordinate or cooperate each other. Surprisingly
enough, we prove that centralized NDC is as discriminating as decentralized NDC. However, when we move
to Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Composition, BNDC for short, the situation is completely dif-
ferent. Indeed, we prove that centralized BNDC is strictly ﬁner than decentralized BNDC, hence proving
the quite expected fact that a system that can resist to coordinated attacks is also able to resist to simpler
attacks performed by independent entities.
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1 Introduction
Information ﬂow analysis is considered one of the main techniques for studying
conﬁdentiality in computer systems. Information ﬂow properties aim at deﬁning
the way the information may ﬂow among diﬀerent entities of a compound system.
For instance, these properties may deﬁne constraints on the kind of information ﬂow
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that can be set among diﬀerent groups of entities with diﬀerent security levels (e.g.,
high and low). Usually, the goal is to prevent any possible ﬂow from the conﬁdential
(high) level to the public (low) one.
Several formalizations have been proposed in the literature to capture the intu-
itive idea of ﬂow of information. Most of them originate from the basic idea of Non
Interference, NI for short, proposed in [12] on deterministic machines: Basically
one wants that low output variables do not depend on high inputs. This intuitive
notion has been then extended to trace based models. Assume there are two groups
of users, G and G′, and, given any input sequence of actions γ, let γ′ be its subse-
quence obtained by deleting all the actions of users in G. G is non interfering with
G′ if and only if for every input sequence γ, users in G′ obtain the same outputs
after the execution of γ and γ′.
This basic notion has been also adapted and generalized to the richer setting
of nondeterministic and concurrent machines. Among the many deﬁnitions derived
from NI (see e.g., [4,6,14,20]), here we consider the Non Deducibility on Composi-
tion property (NDC, see [4]). Intuitively, a system is NDC if, by interacting with
every possible high level user, it always appears the same to low level users, so that
no information at all can be deduced by low level users. The above idea can be
instantiated in a lot of ways, by choosing a particular way of interacting between
systems and various criteria of equivalence. First we consider trace equivalence: A
system E is NDC if E \ H (i.e., E where all high level actions are prevented) is
trace equivalent to E in parallel with any high level process Π where all the high
actions in H are restricted (hence cooperation on high actions is forced). In other
words, the low view of the behavior of system E is not modiﬁed by the presence
of process Π, that can be considered as an intruder that tries to break the system.
Observe that this deﬁnition is given by considering at most one possible intruder
(high user).
We can obtain a bisimulation based NDC by simply substituting the trace equiv-
alence with bisimulation equivalence. We consider the notion of Bisimulation Non
Deducibility on Compositions, BNDC for short, was proposed in [4,6]. Also in this
case the deﬁnition is given by considering at most one possible high user.
The goal of this work is to extend the idea of NDC and BNDC also to dis-
tributed systems, where the possible intruders can be more than one and may also
coordinate their eﬀorts. A distributed system is modelled as a transducer [13], i.e.,
a context which can receive in input, say, n actions in diﬀerent locations and which
may produce a tuple of outputs. Intuitively, a context of the form C(X1, . . . , Xn)
can be seen as a distributed partially speciﬁed system [15,16,17,8], i.e., a system C
with holes, where the components X1 . . . Xn are not speciﬁed. These unspeciﬁed
components are meant to be the potential intruders of the system.
We want to study whether such contexts respect information ﬂow properties,
in particular those based on NDC and BNDC, whatever the possible intruders are.
In both cases, we proceed by following two diﬀerent approaches: A centralized
approach and a decentralized one.
We ﬁrst consider the NDC property. Given the context C(X1, . . . , Xn), where
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each Xi denotes a hole in the system, we may deﬁne decentralized NDC (DNDC
for short) as the NDC property where the n intruders act independently, without
communicating or coordinating their activities. A system satisfying decentralided
NDC should resist to distributed attacks conducted by n independent intruders.
Then, we introduce the concept of centralized NDC (CNDC for short) in which the
n intruders are centrally controlled and thus considered as a unique context which
performs a vector of n actions, a˜ = (a1, . . . , an). A system satisfying CNDC should
resist to distributed attacks conducted by n cooperating intruders (or by one single
intruder that has complete control of the n locations in which interaction with the
system is possible).
Interestingly enough we prove the quite surprising result that CNDC (i.e., trace-
based Non-Deducibility on Composition) is as discriminating as DNDC.
For that reason we consider the BNDC property. Indeed, when trace semantics
is replaced by the more discriminating bisimulation semantics, the results above are
completely diﬀerent.
As expected, centralized BNDC is proved to be ﬁner than decentralized BNDC.
Still, the weaker notion is meaningful because, as a matter of fact, a system that
is centralized BNDC is able to resist also to strongly coordinated attacks that, in
a real-life distributed environment, might not be possible. We provide a simple
counterexample showing that the reverse implication does not hold, i.e., a context
which is decentralized BNDC, but not centralized BNDC.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls some notions about context
theory and introduces some idea behind the use of context for modelling distributed
systems. Section 3 presents our framework for the speciﬁcation of information ﬂow
properties in a distributed system. Section 4 shows a comparison with related work.
In Section 5 we report the conclusion of the paper. Finally, in Appendix we report
the proves of the main theorems.
2 Background
In this section we recall some preliminary notions about contexts theory from [13].
2.1 Context
First of all, we recall the deﬁnition of context.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A context system C is a structure C = (〈Cmn 〉n,m, Act, 〈→n,m〉n,m)
where Cmn is a set of n-to-m contexts; Act is a set of actions; Act0 = Act ∪ {0}
where 0 ∈ Act is a distinguished no-action symbol, Actk0 is a tuple of k actions
∈ Act0, and →n,m⊆ Cmn × (Actn0 ×Actm0 )× Cmn is the transduction-relation for the
n-to-m contexts satisfying (C, a˜, 0˜, D) ∈→n,m if and only if C = D and a˜ = 0˜ for
all contexts C,D ∈ Cmn .
For (C, a˜, b˜, C ′) ∈→n,m we usually write C
b˜−→˜
a C ′, leaving the indices of → to be
determined by the context, and we interpret this as:
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Inaction:
C
0˜−→˜
0 C for all C
Preﬁx:
a∗
a−→
0 I1
Restriction:
\L
a−→a \L a ∈ L
Choice:
(1) +
a−−−→
(a, 0) Π12 (2) +
a−−−→
(0, a) Π22 for a ∈ Act
Projection:
Πin
a−−→
i(a) Πin
Identity:
In
a˜−→˜
a In
Parallel:
(1) ‖
τ−−−→
(a, a¯) ‖ (2) ‖
a−−−→
(a, 0) ‖ (3) ‖
a−−−→
(0, a) ‖
where i(a) ∈ Actn0 with the ith component being a and all the others being 0.
Table 1
Semantics of CCS context system.
Consuming actions a˜, context C can produce actions b˜ and change into C ′.
In a transduction C
b˜−→˜
a C ′, certain components in a˜ and/or b˜ can be 0 indicating
that the corresponding internal process and/or external observer is not involved in
the transduction. In particular the last condition of→n,m means that a context can
always and only produce nothing without consuming anything.
In order to give some example of contexts, we present here how it is possible to
see process algebra operators as contexts.
Example 2.2 CCS process algebra (see [19]) can be seen as a context system with
the following contexts: preﬁx a∗ ∈ C11 for a ∈ Act, restriction \L ∈ C11 where
L ⊆ Act. Choice and parallel context +, ‖ ∈ C12 ; inactive N˜il ∈ Cmn for any n and
m. There are also the identity context In ∈ Cnn and the projection Πin ∈ C1n. The
semantics deﬁnition of CCS context is in Table 1.
2.1.1 Operations between contexts
Several operations are allowed between contexts.
Composition of contexts
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let C = (〈Cmn 〉n,m, Act, 〈→n,m〉n,m) be a context system. A com-
position on C is a dyadic operation ◦ on contexts such that whenever C ∈ Cmn and
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D ∈ Crm then D ◦C ∈ Crn. Furthermore, the transductions for a context D ◦C with
C ∈ Cmn and D ∈ Crm are fully characterized by the following rule:
C
b˜−→˜
a C ′ D
c˜−→˜
b D′
D ◦ C
c˜−→˜
a D′ ◦ C ′
where a˜ = (a1, . . . , an), b˜ = (b1, . . . , bn) and c˜ = (c1, . . . , cn) are vectors of actions.
We usually write C(P ) to denote a composed context; the combined process
C(P ) is nothing but the composition C ◦P as follows form the context composition.
Example 2.4 In order to explain how the composition between contexts works, we
recall an example given in [13].
Let a.b.Nil be a standard CCS term. It can be composed from the constructs
as a∗ ◦ b∗ ◦Nil. Using the inference rule for composition, we can infer the following
transitions:
C
−
a∗
a−→
0 I1
−
b∗◦Nil 0−→b∗◦Nil
a∗ ◦ b∗ ◦Nil a−→ I1 ◦ b∗ ◦Nil
and
C
−
I1
b−→
b I1
−
b∗
b−→
0 I1
−
Nil
0−→Nil
b∗◦Nil b−→I1◦Nil
I1 ◦ b∗ ◦Nil b−→ I1 ◦ I1 ◦Nil
Obviously, a composed context of the form Im ◦ C has the same behavior as C.
Product of contexts
In order to represent a system with n holes, we use a n-to-1 context C ∈ C1n. If C
is combined with a context D ∈ Cnm, we obtain C◦D ∈ C1m. If m = 0 then we obtain
a process. The context D, in this case, provides a simultaneous expansion of the n
holes in C. To allow the expansion of the n holes to be carried out independently, it is
deﬁned an independent combination of n contexts as D1×. . .×Dn, where Di ∈ C1mi ,
i = 1, . . . , n and Di is intended as an expansion of the i’th hole of C in such a way
that m =
∑
i mi. This motivates the following construct of (independent) products
of contexts.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let C = (〈Cmn 〉n,m, Act, 〈→n,m〉n,m) be a context system. A product
on C is a dyadic operation × on contexts, s.t. whenever C ∈ Cmn and D ∈ Csr then
C × D ∈ Cm+sn+r . Furthermore the transduction for a context C × D are fully
characterized by the following rule:
C
b˜−→˜
a C ′ D
d˜−→˜
c D′
C ×D
b˜d˜−→˜
ac˜ C ′ ×D′
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where juxtaposition of vectors a˜ = (a1, . . . , an) and c˜ = (c1, . . . , cr) is the vector
a˜c˜ = (a1, . . . , an, c1, . . . , cr) and juxtaposition of vectors b˜ = (b1, . . . , bn) and d˜ =
(d1, . . . , dr) is the vector b˜d˜ = (b1, . . . , bn, d1, . . . , dr).
We usually write the combined process C(P1, . . . , Pn) as a shorthand for C ◦
(P1 × . . . × Pn). Since we consider asynchronous contexts, it is not required that
all the components P1, . . . , Pn contribute in a transition of the combined process
C(P1, . . . , Pn), i.e., some of the Pi could perform a 0 action.
Example 2.6 Also in this case, since in the rest of the paper composition and
product operation are the most useful for our purposes, we recall an example already
presented in [13].
Let a.Nil + b.Nil be a standard CCS term. It can be composed from the
constructs as + ◦ (a∗ ◦Nil× b∗ ◦Nil). Using the inference rule for composition and
product, we can infer the following transitions:
C
−
+
a−−−→
(a,0)Π12
C
−
a∗
a−→
0 I1
−
Nil
0−→Nil
a∗◦Nil a−→I1◦Nil
−
b∗◦Nil 0−→b∗◦Nil
a∗◦Nil×b∗◦Nil(a,0)−→I1◦Nil×b∗◦Nil
P
+ ◦ (a∗ ◦Nil × b∗ ◦Nil) a−→ Π12 ◦ (I1 ◦Nil × b∗ ◦Nil)
where the behavior of Π12 ◦ (I1 ◦Nil× b∗ ◦Nil) is behavioral equivalent to Nil since,
in accordance with the standard CCS transition relation, a.Nil + b.Nil a−→ Nil.
Feed-back on context
In order to deal with recursion, a construction of feed-back on contexts is deﬁned,
s.t. whenever C ∈ Cnn then C† ∈ Cn0 and C† is equivalent to C ◦ C†. Formally, we
have the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.7 ([13]) Let C = (〈Cmn 〉n,m, Act, 〈→n,m〉n,m) be a context system. A
feed-back on C is a unary operation †, on contexts of C s.t., whenever C ∈ Cn,n then
C† ∈ Cn0 . Furthermore, the transduction for a context C† with C ∈ Cnn is fully
characterized by the rule:
C
b¯−→¯
a C ′ C† a¯−→ D
C† b¯−→ C ′ ◦D
In order to understand the meaning of this operator we recall the following
example (see [13]).
Example 2.8 Let us consider the CCS process deﬁned as X = a.X. It can be
realized as the context (a∗)†. Indeed, using the inference rule of the feed-back, we
obtain the following transition:
F
−
a∗
a−→
0 I1
−
(a∗)† 0−→(a∗)†
(a∗)† a−→ I1 ◦ (a∗)†
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and in fact this is the only transition for (a∗)†.
2.1.2 Open systems as transducers
According to [13], the theory of contexts is useful to model and analyze distributed
partially speciﬁed systems, i.e., systems in which more than one component is un-
speciﬁed. As a matter of fact, a partially speciﬁed system can be formalized by
contexts as a system of the form C(X1, . . . , Xn), where C denotes the known part
of the system and X1, . . . , Xn denote components still remaining unknown. In
process algebra, the partial implementation C(X1, . . . , Xn) can be described as an
expression with X1, . . . , Xn as free variables that may be replaced by closed expres-
sion P1, . . . , Pn. By syntactically replacing each Xi by the corresponding Pi, we get
the closed expression C(P1, . . . , Pn).
In this way we have a general framework that permits us to consider a complex
and general scenario. Indeed, whether we consider a partially speciﬁed system,
several scenarios can be considered in order to obtain a closed system. In the
easiest case, the number of the unspeciﬁed components is one. In this case there
is a unique hole that a process can ﬁll in. On the other hand, if we consider
a system in which there are several holes, we may distinguish from two diﬀerent
approaches for the analysis of such systems: By considering all n holes as a unique
hole of cardinality n (in this case we put a central process that performs a vector
of n actions), or by considering several independent unary processes whose product
closes the expression.
Example 2.9 Let C1 = h∗1 ◦ l∗1 ◦h∗1 ◦Nil and C2 = h∗2 ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil be two contexts. Let
us consider a context C ∈ C12 built as a composition of several contexts as follows:
C = ‖ ◦ (\{h1,h2,h¯1,h¯2} ◦ ‖(C1 ×X1))× (\{h1,h2,h¯1,h¯2} ◦ ‖(C2 ×X2))
Here we have explicitly denoted by X1 and X2, in C10 , the free variables in C
1
0 of
the contexts in order to make the context readable. Being ‖ ∈ C12 , C1 and C2 in C10
it is not diﬃcult to see that C is eﬀectively in C12 . X1 and X2 represent respectively
the ﬁrst and the second component of the context C ∈ C12 .
Informally, this context allows for the synchronization on actions h1, h2. This
permits us, as we will see after, to control sequences of executions of low actions,
such as l1 and l2.
In order to obtain a closed expression we have to combine C with a context in
C20 . Such context could be a binary contexts such as, for instance, P = (h¯1, 0)
∗ ◦
(h¯1, 0)∗ ◦ (0, h¯2)∗ ◦ N˜il. Or the product of a couple of contexts in C10 , for instance
P1 = h¯1
∗ ◦ h¯1∗ ◦Nil and P2 = h¯2∗ ◦Nil. As a matter of fact, the product P1 × P2
is a context in C20 as required. In this case the closed expression is C ◦ (P1 × P2).
Referring to Deﬁnition 2.3, the context C ◦P behaves according to the following
rule:
C
τ−−−−→
(h¯1, 0)C ′ P
(h¯1,0)−→ P ′
C(P ) τ−→ C ′(P ′)
(1)
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where P ′ = (h¯1, 0)∗ ◦ (0, h¯2)∗ ◦ N˜il and C ′ = ‖ ◦ (\{h1,h2h¯1,h¯2} ◦ ‖(C ′1 × X1) ×
\{h1,h2,h¯1,h¯2} ◦ ‖(C2 × X2)) where C ′1 = l∗1 ◦ h∗1 ◦ Nil. Obviously this is the ﬁrst
transition. The rest of the transduction is omitted, but it is possible to calculate
the following steps by applying the composition rule. At the end we obtain that
C(P ) has the same behavior as τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦ τ∗ ◦ τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil. This is the only maximal
sequence of actions allowed for this composition of contexts. As a matter of fact,
informally, if C2 pretends to perform the ﬁrst action, it is forbidden by the restriction
\{h1,h2,h¯1,h¯2}. Hence the ﬁrst ‖ takes the ﬁrst action from the ﬁrst component
producing the transition showed in Equation (1). A similar reasoning is made for
the second and third steps of the computation, so the context performs l∗1 ◦ τ . At
this point the ﬁrst component is reduced to Nil so we have a synchronization on
the second component and then the action l2 is unblocked.
Let us now consider the distributed case. Referring to how the contexts are
built, we have the following ﬁrst transition:
−
C
τ−−−−→
(h¯1,0)C′
−
P1
h¯1−→P ′1
−
P2
0−→P2
P1×P2(h¯1,0)−→ P ′1×P2
C(P1, P2)
τ−→ C ′(P ′1, P2)
It is possible to note that, in this case, the ﬁrst step is similar because the ﬁrst
action is performed by P1. There is a diﬀerence between the behavior of C(P ) and
C(P1, P2) if the ﬁrst action is performed by P2, or the diﬀerence appears at the
second steps of transaction. As a matter of fact, in the ﬁrst case, we have to follow
the behavior of P ′ and C ′1, on the contrary, in the second case the ﬁrst (or second)
step could be performed by P2 and C2. This crucial diﬀerence will be used in the
following to prove a central result of this paper.
2.1.3 Behavioral Equivalences
In order to have a method to compare behaviors of contexts, we recall some deﬁ-
nitions of behavioral equivalences. We start with the deﬁnition of trace equivalence
for contexts.
Let us start by giving some notations used in the following.
Let us consider τ˜ as a tuple of actions in which there are no actions diﬀerent
from τ or 0. Let a˜ = (a1, . . . , an) be a vector of actions in Actn0 . Then ˇ˜a = a˜ when
ai = τ for all i = 1, . . . , n, or ˇ˜a = a˜[0\τ ] where all the occurrences of the τ actions
in the vector are replaced by the no action 0. In particular ˇ˜τ = τ˜ , i.e., if the vector
is composed only by τ or 0 actions, the substitution is not performed.
Then, notation C τ˜=⇒ C ′ denotes that C and C ′ belongs to the reﬂexive and
transitive closure of τ˜−→. Also, C ˇ˜a=⇒ C ′′ if C τ˜=⇒ ˇ˜a−→ τ˜=⇒ C ′′.
Let γ = a˜1 . . . a˜n ∈ Actn0\{τ˜} be a sequence of vectors of actions, i.e., a trace,
where Actn0\{τ˜} is the set of vectors of actions of length n without the n-tuple τ˜ .
Let γˇ = ˇ˜a1 . . . ˇ˜an be a sequence of vectors of actions in which each occurrences
of τ actions in each vector has been replaced by 0. C
γˇ
=⇒ C ′ if C ˇ˜a1=⇒ ... ˇ˜an=⇒ C ′
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Let C ∈ Cn0 be a context, then the set of traces of C is Tr(C) = {γˇ|∃C ′ C
γˇ
=⇒
C ′}.
Deﬁnition 2.10 Let C,D ∈ Cn0 be two contexts. We deﬁne the relation of trace
inclusion, denoted by ≤T as follows:
C ≤T D iﬀ Tr(C) ⊆ Tr(D)
Moreover, C and D are trace equivalent, denoted by ≈T , iﬀ Tr(C) = Tr(D).
Other behavioral equivalences are deﬁned for contexts. We just recall the def-
initions of simulation and bisimulation equivalences (see [19]) by distinguishing
between a strong version and a weak one.
Deﬁnition 2.11 Let C = (〈Cmn 〉n,m, Act, 〈→n,m〉n,m) be a context system. Then
an n-to-m strong simulation R is a binary relation on Cmn s.t., whenever (C,D) ∈ R
and a˜ ∈ Actn0 , b˜ ∈ Actm0 , then the following holds:
if C
b˜−→˜
a C ′, then D
b˜−→˜
a D′ for some D′ with (C ′, D′) ∈ R
We write C ≺ D in case (C,D) ∈ R for some n-to-m simulation R.
A strong bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are simulations. We
represent with ∼ the union of all the strong bisimulations.
Now we are able to give the deﬁnition of weak bisimulation by considering that, in
the rest of the paper, we use it w.r.t. contexts in Cn0 . Hence we consider a deﬁnition
that is an extension of the deﬁnition of weak bisimulation given by Milner in [19]
for processes, that, as we have already said, can be seen as contexts in C10 .
Deﬁnition 2.12 Let C = (〈Cn0 〉0,n, Act, 〈→0,n〉0,n) be a context system. Then a
0-to-n weak simulation R is a binary relation on Cn0 s.t., whenever (C,D) ∈ R and
a˜ ∈ Actn0 , then the following holds:
if C a˜−→ C ′, then D ˇ˜a=⇒ D′ for some D′ with (C ′, D′) ∈ R.
We write C  D in case (C,D) ∈ R for some 0-to-n simulation R.
A weak bisimulation is a relation R s.t. both R and R−1 are simulations. We
represent with ≈ the union of all the weak bisimulations.
Theorem 2.13 ([13]) ∼ is preserved by composition, product and feed-back of con-
texts.
2.2 Some information ﬂow properties
Information ﬂow properties are a particular class of security properties which aim
at controlling the way information may ﬂow among diﬀerent entities. They have
been ﬁrst proposed as a means to ensure conﬁdentiality, in particular to verify if
access control policies are suﬃcient to guarantee the secrecy of (possibly classiﬁed)
R. Gorrieri et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 236 (2009) 65–84 73
information. Indeed, even if access control is a well studied technique for system
security, it is not trivial to ﬁnd an access control policy which guarantees that no
information leak is possible.
In the literature, there are many diﬀerent security deﬁnitions reminiscent of the
information ﬂow idea, each based on some system model (see [4,6,14,20]). The
central property is the Non Deducibility on composition (NDC, see [4]). Intuitively,
a system is NDC if, by interacting with every possible high level user, it always
appears the same to low level users, so that no information at all can be deduced
by low level users.
Exploiting the relation of bisimulation, we obtain the notion of Bisimulation Non
Deducibility on Compositions, BNDC for short, proposed in [4,6] as generalization
of the classical idea of Non-Interference (see [12]) to nondeterministic systems.
In the following we recall the deﬁnition of a non interference properties, NDC
and BNDC properties proposed in [3,4,5,6].
2.2.1 NDC and BNDC properties
To describe information ﬂow property, we can consider two users, High and Low
interacting with the same computer system. We wonder if there is any ﬂow of
information from High to Low.
In [3,4,5,6] a family of information ﬂow security properties called Non Deducibil-
ity on Compositions (NDC, for short) was proposed. Intuitively, a system is NDC
if, by interacting with every possible high level user, it always appears the same to
low level users, so that no information at all can be deduced by low level users. The
above idea can be instantiated in a lot of ways, by choosing a particular way of
interacting between systems and various criteria of equivalence. First we consider
the trace equivalence, thus the NDC is described in terms of CCS process algebra
(see [19]) as follows:
E is NDC iﬀ ∀ Π ∈ High users , (E‖Π)\H ≈T E\H
where H is a set of high actions. NDC requires that high level processes Π are not
able to change the low level behavior of the system represented by \H(E). If it
is equivalent to \H(‖(E × Π)) this clearly means that Π is not able to modify in
any way the execution of E. It is possible to give the deﬁnition of NDC by using
contexts as follows:
E is NDC iﬀ ∀ Π ∈ High users , \H(‖(E ×Π)) ≈T \H(E)
We can obtain a bisimulation based NDC by simply substituting ≈T with ≈. In
particular, in [5,6], the authors argue that BNDC is the right choice. Hence they
give a formulation of BNDC in terms of CCS parallel operator (see [19]). Also in
this case we give the deﬁnition of BNDC by exploiting the semantics of contexts as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2.14 Let Sort(Π) be the set of actions that occurs in Π and let H be
the set of high actions. Let C10,H = {Π | Sort(Π) ⊆ H ∪ {τ}} be the set of High
users. E ∈ C10 is BNDC if and only if ∀Π ∈ C10,H we have \H(‖(E ×Π)) ≈ \H(E).
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Proposition 2.15 ([5,6]) Let C ∈ C10 be a context.
C ∈ BNDC =⇒ C ∈ NDC
The viceversa does not hold, as the following example shows.
Example 2.16 ([5,6]) Let E = +((τ∗ ◦ l∗ ◦Nil)× (τ∗ ◦ h∗ ◦ l∗ ◦Nil)) be a context
in C10 . According to [5,6], E ∈ NDC. However E ∈ BNDC: let us consider
Π = h¯∗ ◦ Nil, then \H(‖(E × Π)) = +((τ∗ ◦ l∗ ◦ Nil) × (τ∗ ◦ τ∗ ◦ l∗ ◦ Nil)) while
\H(E) = +((τ∗ ◦ l∗ ◦Nil)× (τ∗ ◦Nil)).
3 Speciﬁcation of Information Flow Properties for Dis-
tributed Systems
In this paper we want to extend the deﬁnition of NDC and BNDC properties given
for processes in order to deal also with distributed systems. In particular, we con-
sider a partially speciﬁed system in which several components are unspeciﬁed. We
describe it as a context. Then we wonder if the context is NDC and/or BNDC.
Example 3.1 In order to make this example readable we use the inﬁx notation
that is more suitable than the preﬁx one of the context theory.
Let us consider a system speciﬁed as follows:
C = ((h∗0 ◦ l∗0)†‖X0)\{h0,h¯0}‖((h∗1 ◦ l∗1)†‖X1)\{h1,h¯1}
Let us interpret l0 and l1 as bit 0 and 1 respectively. According to how we choose X0
and X1 it is possible to generate sequences of 0 and 1 obtaining (possible inﬁnite)
that represent information that (indirectly) ﬂows from high to low. As a matter of
fact, the high level user is able to generate a string of 0s and 1s that represents a
message that a low level user receives.
3.1 Speciﬁcation of NDC in distributed systems
According to the deﬁnition of NDC (see [3,4,5,6]), there is an universal quantiﬁcation
on all possible high users. Hence it is possible to specify the NDC property as an
open system S = \H(‖(E × )), where there is a hole in which we have to consider
a high user. The system S has to satisfy the NDC property whatever the behavior
of a high user is.
The scenario we want to analyze here consists in a system in which more than
one high user acts on the system. A natural extension of this reasoning to a sys-
tem in which there are more than one unspeciﬁed component, is considering these
components as high users, i.e., if C ∈ C1n there are n high processes in C10 .
In this section we present how the speciﬁcation of the NDC property can be
extended to consider systems with more than one high level user. We consider two
diﬀerent approaches: The centralized approach, CNDC, and the decentralized one,
DNDC.
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First we give the following notational deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let H ⊆ Act be the set of high actions and let Hn ⊆ Actn be the
set of n-tuples of high actions. The context \Hn ∈ Cnn is deﬁned by the following
rule:
\Hn
a˜−→˜
a \Hn a˜ ∈ Hn
where N˜il is the n-ary context that does not perform any action and a˜ ∈ Hn means
that, being a˜ = (a1, . . . , an) there does not exists any ai ∈ H for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us start with the centralized one.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let C ∈ Cmn a generic context. C ∈ CNDC iﬀ
∀X ∈ Cn0,H \HmC(X) ≈T \HmC(N˜il)
As before we have a universal quantiﬁcation into the speciﬁcation that results
diﬃcult to manage. Referring to the theory developed in [9], we want to give a
static characterization of CNDC by using a particular context Topn ∈ Cn0 that is a
a feed-back context on all possible n-tuples of high actions semantically deﬁned as
follows:
Topn† a˜−→ Topn†
for any a˜ ∈ Hn. This context allows for all possible n-tuples of high actions.
The following result holds, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix.
Proposition 3.4 Let C ∈ Cmn be a generic context.
(∀X ∈ Cn0,H \HmC(X) ≈T \HmC(N˜il)) ⇔ \HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il)
This means that the NDC property is statically characterized by the Topn con-
text. In this way the universal quantiﬁcation on all possible high users is embedded
into the context Topn.
Now, let us consider the decentralized approach.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let C ∈ Cmn a generic context. C ∈ DNDC iﬀ
∀X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C10,H \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil)
Also in this case, by exploiting the context Top1 we prove (see the Appendix)
the following result.
Proposition 3.6 Let C ∈ Cmn a generic context.
(∀X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C10,H \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil))

\HmC(Top1, . . . T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . Nil)
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Hence, also in the decentralized case, it is possible to statically characterize
DNDC.
In order to study the relation that exists between CNDC and DNDC we give
the following proposition (proof in the Appendix).
Proposition 3.7 Let C ∈ Cmn a generic context.
\HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il) ⇔ \HmC(Top1, . . . T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . Nil)
Hence there is no diﬀerence between the two approaches if we consider the
trace equivalence as behavioral relation between contexts in the analysis of the
information ﬂow properties. This means that there is no diﬀerences if the system is
attacked by n independent malicious agents with no knowledge each other or by n
attackers that manage to violate a system in a collaborative way.
In the next subsection, we will show that this is no longer the case if bisimulation
is used in place of trace semantics. Hence, according to what Focardi and Gorrieri
have already concluded about the analysis of open system with only one high user
([5,6]), also in presence of several high components, the BNDC property turns out
to be more interesting and appropriated than NDC.
3.2 Speciﬁcation of BNDC in distributed systems
According to [7,15,16,17,8], the BNDC property can be analyzed by using the open
system paradigm (see [15,16,17,8]).
As we have already done in the previous section for the NDC property, we
extend the speciﬁcation of BNDC property to distributed systems by considering
that more than one high level user interacts with the system. Also in this case, we
consider these high level users as unspeciﬁed components of a distributed system
modelled by a context, e.g., if C ∈ C1n there are n high processes.
We distinguish between a centralized notion of BNDC (CBNDC) and a decen-
tralized one (DBNDC).
First we specify the CBNDC, in which we consider the unspeciﬁed part of the
system as a context that can perform a vector of actions.
Deﬁnition 3.8 Let C ∈ Cmn be a context and let Cn0,H be the set of n-ary High
context. C is CBNDC if and only if:
∀X ∈ Cn0,H \Hm(C(X)) ≈ \Hm(C(N˜il))
where N˜il is the n-ary context that does not perform any action.
Second, we take into account, a decentralized notion of BNDC, called DBNDC, in
which we consider the unspeciﬁed part of the system as made of several independent
contexts composed by product.
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Deﬁnition 3.9 Let C ∈ Cmn be a context and let C10,H be the set of unary High
context. C is DBNDC if and only if:
∀X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C10,H \Hm(C ◦ (X1 × . . .×Xn)) ≈ \Hm(C ◦ (Nil × . . .×Nil))
where, according to the rule of the product operation, the product X1 × . . . ×Xn
in a context in Cn0,H
In order to compare Deﬁnition 3.8 and Deﬁnition 3.9 we give the following result.
Proposition 3.10 Let C be a context in Cmn . If C is CBNDC, then C is also
DBNDC.
Proof [Sketch] It is enough to observe that for any D ∈ C10,H × ... × C10,H (for n
times), there exists D′ ∈ Cn0,H such that D and D′ are strong bisimilar. 
However the vice-versa of the Proposition 3.10 does not hold as the following
example shows.
Example 3.11 Let us consider now a context D ∈ C12 s.t. D = τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil + τ∗ ◦
l∗2 ◦Nil+(τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)+C where C is the same context of Example 2.9.
In order to make this example readable we use the inﬁx notation that is more
suitable than the preﬁx one in order to point out why the two approaches diﬀer.
As in Example 2.9, ﬁrst we consider to combine D with another context P =
(h¯1, 0)∗ ◦(h¯1, 0)∗ ◦(0, h¯2) ∈ C20 . Here we show that D is not CBNDC. As a matter of
fact by calculating D◦N˜il we obtain τ∗◦l∗1◦Nil+τ∗◦l∗2◦Nil+(τ∗◦l∗1◦Nil‖τ∗◦l∗2◦Nil).
On the contrary, by considering P = (h¯1, 0)∗ ◦ (h¯1, 0)∗ ◦ (0, h¯2), we obtain that D◦P
is τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil + τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil + (τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil) + τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦ τ∗ ◦ τ∗ ◦ l∗2 that
it is not weakly bisimilar to D ◦ N˜il.
Now, we want to prove that D is DBNDC. It is not diﬃcult to note that the
possible contexts that can interact with D and make an attack are P1 = h¯1
∗ ◦
h¯1
∗ ◦ Nil and P ′1 = h¯1∗ ◦ Nil, for the ﬁrst component and P2 = h¯2∗ ◦ Nil for the
second one. It is possible to prove that both \H(D(P1, P2)) ≈ \H(D(Nil,Nil)) and
\H(D(P ′1, P2)) ≈ \H(D(Nil,Nil)). Hence C is DBNDC 4 .
First of all we calculate:
\H(D(Nil,Nil)) = τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil + τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil + (τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)
In the ﬁrst case, by calculating D ◦ (P1 × P2) we obtain:
τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil+τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil+(τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)+(τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦τ∗ ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)
that it is weakly bisimilar to τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil+ τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil+(τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)
4 To be complete we have also to prove that \H(D(Nil, P2)) ≈ \H(D(Nil,Nil)), \H(D(P1, Nil)) ≈
\H(D(Nil,Nil)) and \H(D(P ′1, Nil)) ≈ \H(D(Nil,Nil)). These follow obviously, so we decide to show
the two more diﬃcult cases.
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In the second case, by calculating D ◦ (P ′1 × P2) we obtain:
τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil+ τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil+ (τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil) + (τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil)
that it is weakly bisimilar to τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil+ τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil+(τ∗ ◦ l∗1 ◦Nil‖τ∗ ◦ l∗2 ◦Nil).
It is interesting to note that the context P ∈ C20 is an example of a process
that can not be written as product of two unary contexts, i.e., there do not exist
P1, P2 ∈ C10 such that P1 × P2 is weakly bisimilar to P . Hence the main diﬀerence
between the CBNDC and DBNDC is that, in the centralized case, the universal
quantiﬁcation is made on contexts in Cn0 ⊃ C10 × . . .× C10︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
To sum up, if we consider the trace equivalence as behavioral equivalence among
contexts, we do not have any diﬀerence between the centralized and decentralized
approaches for information ﬂow speciﬁcation, i.e., there are no diﬀerences between
CNDC and DNDC. On the other hand, if we consider bisimulation equivalence,
the two approaches are diﬀerent. This depends on the fact that it is not possible
to give a static characterization of BNDC in terms of a ﬁnite context (see [9]).
Since the BNDC property is a particular case of both CBNDC and DBNDC, we can
conclude that there is no ﬁnite context playing the same role as Topn for the trace
case for statically characterize neither CBNDC or DBNDC.
4 Related Work
Some work has been done in the study of information ﬂow properties also in dis-
tributed systems.
In [10] the authors have studied the information ﬂow properties in a mobile
agents setting. They have considered a distributed system with several unspeciﬁed
locations and have studied when the system satisﬁes the information ﬂow properties
considering that an agent performs a diﬀerent action in each diﬀerent location. They
refer to this property as mobile BNDC, M BNDC for short. In our framework we
have several agents and we also consider the possibility that they interact each
other and with the environment. This is not the case of M BNDC in which a single
process passes from a location to another by performing a set of actions in each
location, sequentially. There is not reference to NDC property in dynamic contexts
since they directly consider the bisimulation relation.
In [1] the authors have studied which could be the eﬀect of the environment on
the information ﬂow security in a multilevel system by referring to context, even if
they do not referred to the context theory developed in [13]. Indeed, they introduce
the notion of secure contexts for a class of processes as a parametric notion w.r.t.
both the observation equivalence and the operation to characterize the low level
views of a process. In particular they also show that BNDC and NDC, are just
special instances of the general notion. Our work can be considered an extension of
this one in which we consider more then one high user.
In [21] the authors pointed out that in general BNDC is not compositional w.r.t.
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all process algebras operators. This result is an extension of the one given in [17], in
which the author proved that BNDC is not compositional w.r.t. parallel operator.
Moreover, in [21], the author has deﬁned several properties, stronger than BNDC,
in order to have properties that are compositional w.r.t. process algebra operators.
In this work we have proposed a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the problem that takes
into account the environment of the system.
BNDC has been also studied in the distributed model of elementary net sys-
tems in [2], where, however, one unique intruder is considered, in the same line of
centralized BNDC.
Another framework for the speciﬁcation of distributed systems has been given in
[11]. The authors propose the tile logic as a new formalism, equipped with features
for supporting an easy speciﬁcation of concurrent and distributed systems. Each
rule in tile logic aims at describing the possible behavior of an open system. It
recalls sequent calculus. Security aspects are not treated there.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we presented a possible extension of the speciﬁcation of information
ﬂow properties also to a framework in which more than one high level user is active.
Then we have extended the approach, based on the open system paradigm used to
specify information ﬂow properties such as NDC and BNDC with one high level
user, to deal with such a more complex scenario.
We aim to extend this research by considering also the veriﬁcation problem.
We are working on a method to verify both centralized and distributed BNDC.
Moreover we will also investigate what could happen if some unspeciﬁed components
of the analyzed partially speciﬁed system can perform low actions. In particular we
could consider that the unspeciﬁed components of the system are not only possible
malicious agents but could also be generic processes that can perform high actions
as well as low ones.
Moreover we intend to deal with enforcement mechanisms for monitoring infor-
mation ﬂow properties in distributed system. In particular, we would like to extend
the work in [18] to deﬁne and synthesize controller operators also for the properties
deﬁned in this work.
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A Technical Proofs
Before the proof of Proposition 3.4 and 3.6 we give the following lemmata.
Lemma A.1 ∀X ∈ Cn0,H X ≺ Topn
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Proof Let S be the binary relation deﬁned as follows:
S = {(C, Topn)|C ∈ Cn0 }
The thesis follows immediately if relation S is a strong simulation. But this derives
trivially from the deﬁnition of Topn, as it can perform any vector of high actions.
Indeed, if C a˜−→ C ′, then Topn a˜−→ Topn with (C ′, T opn) ∈ S. Hence we have the
thesis. 
Lemma A.2 Let C,D ∈ Cn0 be two contexts. The following hold:
• C ≺ D ⇒ C ≤T D
• C ∼ D ⇒ C ≈T D
Proof
• If C ≺ D then, if C a˜−→ C ′, there exists D′ s.t. D a˜−→ D′ with C ′ ≺ D′.
This means that computations of length one performed by C are matched by
corresponding computations of length one performed by D. Inductively, one can
prove that if C a˜1−→ C1 a˜2−→ C2 . . . a˜n−→ Cn, then D a˜1−→ D1 a˜2−→ D2 . . . a˜n−→ Dn with
Cn ≺ Dn. This ensures that any trace of C, that can be obtained by abstracting
on the sequence a˜1a˜2 . . . a˜n, is also a trace of D.
• For the deﬁnition of bisimulation, C ∼ D implies that C ≺ D and D ≺ C.
Hence, for the previous point of this lemma, we have that Tr(C) ⊆ Tr(D) and
Tr(D) ⊆ Tr(C). This implies that C ≈T D.

Proposition 3.4 Let C ∈ Cmn a generic context.
(∀X ∈ Cn0,H \HmC(X) ≈T \HmC(N˜il)) ⇔ \HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il)
Proof The proof is divided into two parts:
⇒ Since ∀X ∈ Cn0,H \HmC(X) ≈T \HmC(N˜il), it holds obviously also for Topn.
Hence \HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il).
⇐ We prove that \HmC(N˜il) ≤T \HmC(X) ≤T \HmC(Topn).
For Lemma A.1, X ≺ Topn. Since ≺ is a pre-congruence for context, i.e., it
is a congruence and a pre-order, we have that \HmC(X) ≺ \HmC(Topn). Hence,
for Lemma A.2, \HmC(X) ≤T \HmC(Topn).
A similar reasoning is done by noticing that N˜il ≺ X. Hence, by applying the
previous lemmata, we have that \HmC(N˜il) ≤T \HmC(X).
To sum up \HmC(N˜il) ≤T \HmC(X) ≤T \HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il). Hence
\HmC(X) ≈T \HmC(N˜il).

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Proposition 3.6 Let C ∈ Cmn be a generic context.
(∀X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C10,H \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil))

\HmC(Top1, . . . T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . Nil)
Proof The proof is divided into two parts:
⇓ Since ∀X1, . . . , Xn ∈ C10,H \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil), it holds
obviously also for Top1. Hence \HmC(Top1, . . . , T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil).
⇑ We prove \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil)≤T \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn)≤T \HmC(Top1, . . . , T op1).
For Lemma A.1, each Xi for i = 1, . . . , n Xi ≺ Top1. Since ≺ is a pre-
congruence for the operation of context, i.e., it is a congruence and a pre-order,
we have that
\HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≺ \HmC(Top1, . . . , T op1).
Hence, for Lemma A.2, \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≤T \HmC(Top1, . . . , T op1).
A similar reasoning is done by noticing that Nil ≺ Xi for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Hence, applying the previous lemmas, we have that \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil) ≤T
\HmC(X1, . . . , Xn).
Summing up we thus have \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil) ≤T \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≤T
\HmC(Top1, . . . , T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil). Hence \HmC(X1, . . . , Xn) ≈T
\HmC(Nil, . . . , Nil).

Proposition 3.7 Let C ∈ Cmn be a generic context.
\HmC(Topn) ≈T \HmC(N˜il) ⇔ \HmC(Top1, . . . T op1) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . Nil)
Proof We prove that the two contexts Topn and Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
are strong
bisimilar. Then for Lemma A.2, we conclude that they are also trace equivalent.
Hence the two static characterizations coincide.
Hence, let R be a binary relation deﬁned as follows:
R = {(Topn, T op1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)}
that we want to prove to be a bisimulation. Initially, (Topn, T op1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
) ∈ R
obviously.
If Topn a˜−→ Topn, where a˜−→=(a1,...,an)−→ , we have to prove that there exists C s.t.
Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
a˜−→ C and (Topn, C) ∈ R.
For the semantics deﬁnition of Top1, we consider that the ﬁrst component of
the product performs a1, the second one a2, and so on. Hence, from the semantic
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deﬁnition of Top1, we have that Top1 ai−→ Top1 for i = 1, .., n. Hence, the context C
we are looking for is Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
. Hence, the condition (Topn, C) ∈ R holds
trivially.
If Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
a˜−→ D we want to prove there exists Topn′ s.t. Topn′ a˜−→
Topn and (D,Topn′) ∈ R. Since D, for the same reasoning made before, is
Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
and Topn performs all the possible n-tuples of high action and
goes into itself, the thesis follows directly from the deﬁnition of Topn.
Hence, being Topn and Top1 × . . .× Top1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
bisimilar, since the bisimulation is
a congruence for contexts (see Theorem 2.13), we obtain that \HmC(Topn) ∼
\Hm(C(Top1, . . . T op1)). Consequently, by Lemma A.2, we have \Hm(C(Topn)) ≈T
\Hm(C(Top1, . . . T op1)). Since \Hm(C(N˜il)) ≈T \HmC(Nil, . . . Nil) trivially, we
have the thesis. 
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